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January 29, 2015

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Posted: 29 Jan 2015 12:06 AM PST

Fed Watch: FOMC Decision

Posted: 28 Jan 2015 02:12 PM PST

Tim Duy:

FOMC Decision, by Tim Duy: If you were looking for fireworks from today's FOMC statement, you were disappointed. Indeed, you need to work pretty hard to pull a story out of this statement. It provided little reason to believe that the Fed has shifted its view since December. A June rate hike remains the base case.

The Fed's assessment of the current statement is arguably the best in years:

Information received since the Federal Open Market Committee met in December suggests that economic activity has been expanding at a solid pace. Labor market conditions have improved further, with strong job gains and a lower unemployment rate. On balance, a range of labor market indicators suggests that underutilization of labor resources continues to diminish. Household spending is rising moderately; recent declines in energy prices have boosted household purchasing power. Business fixed investment is advancing, while the recovery in the housing sector remains slow.

The Fed is simply not seeing any warning signs in recent data. Regarding inflation:

Inflation has declined further below the Committee's longer-run objective, largely reflecting declines in energy prices. Market-based measures of inflation compensation have declined substantially in recent months; survey-based measures of longer-term inflation expectations have remained stable.

They continue to dismiss headline inflation, and I think they will continue to do so. And if you continue to insist that the Fed is paralyzed with fear over market based measures of inflation expectations, note that they do not refer to these as "expectations" measures. It is inflation "compensation." From Fed Chair Janet Yellen's most recent press conference:

There are a number of different factors that are bearing on the path of market interest rates, I think, including global economic developments. It is often the case that when oil prices move down and the dollar appreciates, that that tends to put downward pressure on inflation compensation and on longer-term rates. We also have safe-haven flows that may be affecting longer-term Treasury yields. So I can't tell you exactly what is driving market developments. But what I can say is that we are trying to communicate our thoughts as clearly as we can.


Oh, and longer-dated expectations. Well, what I would say, we refer to this in the statement as "inflation compensation" rather than "inflation expectations." The gap between the nominal yields on 10-year Treasuries, for example, and TIPS have declined—that's inflation compensation. And five-year, five-year-forwards, as you've said, have also declined. That could reflect a change in inflation expectations, but it could also reflect changes in assessment of inflation risks. The risk premium that's necessary to compensate for inflation, that might especially have fallen if the probabilities attached to very high inflation have come down. And it can also reflect liquidity effects in markets. And, for example, it's sometimes the case that— when there is a flight to safety, that flight tends to be concentrated in nominal Treasuries and could also serve to compress that spread. So I think the jury is out about exactly how to interpret that downward move in inflation compensation. And we indicated that we are monitoring inflation developments carefully.

They are trying to tell us very clearly that TIPS are not giving a measure of pure inflation expectations. They do not want those measures by themselves to affect market expectations of the path of monetary policy.

Growth risks are balances and low inflation is transitory:

The Committee continues to see the risks to the outlook for economic activity and the labor market as nearly balanced. Inflation is anticipated to decline further in the near term, but the Committee expects inflation to rise gradually toward 2 percent over the medium term as the labor market improves further and the transitory effects of lower energy prices and other factors dissipate. The Committee continues to monitor inflation developments closely.

They make a small nod to international concerns when considering future policy actions:

This assessment will take into account a wide range of information, including measures of labor market conditions, indicators of inflation pressures and inflation expectations, and readings on financial and international developments.

The Fed remains patient and policy is data dependent:

Based on its current assessment, the Committee judges that it can be patient in beginning to normalize the stance of monetary policy. However, if incoming information indicates faster progress toward the Committee's employment and inflation objectives than the Committee now expects, then increases in the target range for the federal funds rate are likely to occur sooner than currently anticipated. Conversely, if progress proves slower than expected, then increases in the target range are likely to occur later than currently anticipated.

June remains on the table. Within the context of the current forecast, I think that June will be difficult to justify in the absence of wage acceleration. A sharp decline in the forecast, or the balance of risks to the forecast, would also prompt a delay. Importantly, at this point they see the current forecast as still the most likely outcome.

Bottom Line: At this point, the Fed does not see market turbulence as an impediment to raising rates. They are willing to hike rates even if stocks are moving sideways (which they probably think is reasonable in the context of expectations for less monetary accommodation). They do not see any data that threatens their baseline forecast. Maybe market participants have written off June, but for the Fed, June remains very much on the table.

'Somebody Is Inside an Echo Chamber. But Who?'

Posted: 28 Jan 2015 10:07 AM PST

Brad DeLong:

Somebody Is Inside an Echo Chamber. But Who?: Paul Krugman fears that somebody is trapped inside an echo chamber, hearing only things that confirm what they already believe...

But how can we tell which side has lost contact with the reality out there? ...

I do not think we have to decide. I think that even if we are uncertain whether the optimistic "insiders" or the pessimistic "outsiders" are correct, elementary prudent optimal-control theory tells us that we should act as if the "outsiders" are right.

But I have gotten ahead of myself:...

So how would we tell whether, right now, it is the outsiders are overstating the dangers to premature tightening, or it is the insiders who are understating the dangers to premature tightening here in the United States?

To answer this question, I think we need to consider five points–the first about our decision procedure, the second about the level of spending consistent with full employment, the third about the degree of uncertainty and variability, the fourth about the vulnerabilities of the economy to spending deviations above and below the projected current-policy path, and the fifth about the effectiveness of our optimal-control levers in different scenarios.

The first point is that if it turns out that we cannot tell–that we have to split the difference–then the considerations that rule are the asymmetries in the situation.

The second point is that no one right now has a good and convincing read on what, exactly, the level of spending consistent with full employment at the currently-projected price level is. Uncertainty is rife: if there was ever a time for considering not just the central tendency of the forecast but the risks on either side and taking optimal control appropriately valuing these risks seriously, it is right now.

The third point is that we are not just uncertain about what the proper full-employment path for demand is, we have much more than the usual amount of uncertainty about nearly all other dimensions of the structure of the economy. To suppose that any of the emergent properties that are policy multipliers can be estimated from data collected during "normal" times is to make an enormous leap of faith.

The fourth point is that downside risks to the forecast greatly exceed upside opportunities. ...

And the fifth point is that, while the Federal Reserve has powerful levers to restrict demand if spending shoots above the desired policy path, its levers to expand demand if spending falls below have been demonstrated over the past six years to be relatively weak.

Thus, if it turns out that we cannot tell–and we cannot tell–then it is not correct that we should split the difference. The considerations that rule are then the asymmetries in the situation. It is, right now, much worse to undershoot than to overshoot full-employment demand...

These asymmetries mean that, as far as policy is concerned, the "outsiders" win any tie and win any near-tie: the "insiders" should govern what policy should be only if there is not just a preponderance of the but clear and convincing evidence on their side.

Yet the Federal Reserve appears to have decided:

  • that those who think that the economy is near full employment and is in a durable recovery have by far the better of the argument as to what the central tendency projected current-policy demand path is.
  • that it is appropriate to make policy via certainty-equivalance.

Given the inability of the Federal Reserve to attain traction at the ZLB, its current frame of mind–which appears to be doing certainty-equivalence policy–makes no sense to me. Certainty-equivalence is appropriate only with a symmetric loss function and a symmetric ability to compensate for deviations on either side of the target. We do not have either of those.

Has there been an explanation of why the Federal Reserve's policy is appropriate, given the uncertainties, given the asymmetry of the loss function, and given the asymmetry of the control levers, that I have missed? If so, where is it?

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