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February 27, 2014

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Latest Posts from Economist's View


'Little Evidence of a 'Big Tradeoff' Between Redistribution and Growth'

Posted: 27 Feb 2014 12:33 AM PST

Redistribution does not appear to hinder economic growth:

Treating Inequality with Redistribution: Is the Cure Worse than the Disease?, by Jonathan D. Ostry and Andrew Berg: Rising income inequality looms high on the global policy agenda, reflecting not only fears of its pernicious social and political effects, (including questions about the consistency of extreme inequality with democratic governance), but also the economic implications. While positive incentives are surely needed to reward work and innovation, excessive inequality is likely to undercut growth, for example by undermining access to health and education, causing investment-reducing political and economic instability, and thwarting the social consensus required to adjust in the face of major shocks.
Understandably, economists have been trying to understand better the links between rising inequality and the fragility of economic growth. Recent narratives include how inequality intensified the leverage and financial cycle, sowing the seeds of crisis; or how political-economy factors, especially the influence of the rich, allowed financial excess to balloon ahead of the crisis.
But what is the role of policy, and in particular fiscal redistribution to bring about greater equality? Conventional wisdom would seem to suggest that redistribution would in itself be bad for growth but, conceivably, by engendering greater equality, might help growth. Looking at past experience, we find scant evidence that typical efforts to redistribute have on average had an adverse effect on growth. And faster and more durable growth seems to have followed the associated reduction in inequality. ...
To put it simply, we find little evidence of a "big tradeoff" between redistribution and growth. Inaction in the face of high inequality thus seems unlikely to be warranted in many cases.

The Obama Stimulus

Posted: 27 Feb 2014 12:24 AM PST

Jeff Frankel says the stimulus worked:

Guest Contribution: "The Obama Stimulus and the 5-Year Anniversary of Market Turnaround", econbrowser: Commentators are taking note of the five-year anniversary of the fiscal stimulus that President Obama enacted during his first month in office. Those who don't like Obama are still asking "if the fiscal stimulus was so great, why didn't it work?" ... Listening to these arguments, one would think that no effect of the Obama stimulus could be seen by the naked eye in the U.S. economic statistics of 2009. Nothing could be further from the truth. ...
If one judges by the economic statistics, the effect could not have been much more immediate, whether one looks at job loss, GDP, or financial market indicators. Look at the graphs below. ...
Of course there are always a lot of things going on. One cannot say for sure what was the effect of the Obama stimulus. And one can debate why the pace of the expansion slowed after 2010 (my own prime culprit is the switch to fiscal austerity). But whether looking at indicators of economic activity, the labor market, or the financial markets, one cannot say that the fiscal stimulus of February 2009 had no apparent impact in the graphs.

Links for 2-27-14

Posted: 27 Feb 2014 12:06 AM PST

'The Pattern of Job Creation and Destruction by Firm Age and Size'

Posted: 27 Feb 2014 12:03 AM PST

What age and size firms have the highest net job creation rates?

The Pattern of Job Creation and Destruction by Firm Age and Size, by John Robertson and Ellyn Terry, macroblog: A recent Wall Street Journal blog post caught our attention. In particular, the following claim:
It's not size that matters—at least when it comes to job creation. The age of the company is a bigger factor.
This observation is something we have also been thinking a lot about over the past few years (see for example, here, here, and here).
The following chart shows the average job-creation rate of expanding firms and the average job-destruction rates of shrinking firms from 1987 to 2011, broken out by various age and size categories:
In the chart, the colors represent age categories, and the sizes of the dot represent size categories. So, for example, the biggest blue dot in the far northeast quadrant shows the average rate of job creation and destruction for firms that are very young and very large. The tiny blue dot in the far east region of the chart represents the average rate of job creation and destruction for firms that are very young and very small. If an age-size dot is above the 45-degree line, then average net job creation of that firm size-age combination is positive—that is, more jobs are created than destroyed at those firms. (Note that the chart excludes firms less than one year old because, by definition in the data, they can have only job creation.)
The chart shows two things. First, the rate of job creation and destruction tends to decline with firm age. Younger firms of all sizes tend to have higher job-creation (and job-destruction) rates than their older counterparts. That is, the blue dots tend to lie above the green dots, and the green dots tend to be above the orange dots.
The second feature is that the rate of job creation at larger firms of all ages tends to exceed the rate of job destruction, whereas small firms tend to destroy more jobs than they create, on net. That is, the larger dots tend to lie above the 45-degree line, but the smaller dots are below the 45-degree line. ...
Apart from new firms, it seems that the combination of youth (between one and ten years old) and size (more than 250 employees) has tended to yield the highest rate

Links for 2-26-14

Posted: 26 Feb 2014 10:25 AM PST

Fed Watch: Tarullo on Monetary Policy and Financial Stability

Posted: 26 Feb 2014 06:36 AM PST

Tim Duy is helping to fill the void -- thanks Tim:

Tarullo on Monetary Policy and Financial Stability, by Tim Duy: Federal Reserve Governor Daniel Tarullo tackled the issue of financial stability in a speech that I think is well worth the time to read. The starting point is that many lessons have been learned over the past two cycles, including the perils of ignoring financial stability issues. But how should such concerns be incorporated into the policymaking process? Tarullo:

While few today would take the pre-crisis view common among central bankers that financial stability should not be an explicit concern of monetary policy, there is considerable disagreement over--among other things--the weight that financial stability concerns should carry compared with traditional monetary policy goals of price stability and maximum employment.

Tarullo begins with a brief overview of the financial crisis and the Fed's response, declaring partial victory:

...while the recovery has been frustratingly slow and remains incomplete, there has been real progress, despite the fact that in the past couple of years a restrictive fiscal policy has been working at cross-purposes to monetary policy, and that balance sheet repair and financial strains in Europe have made it more difficult for the economy to muster much self-sustaining momentum.

As Tarullo notes, the Fed's actions have not come without backlash. Of much focus is the size of the balance sheet, and the likelihood of unwinding the resulting liquidity should inflation rear its head. Tarullo quickly dismisses this concern as no longer of major concern given the expansion of the Fed's toolkit. He turns his attention toward bigger game:

The area of concern about recent monetary policy that I want to address at greater length relates to financial stability. The worry is that the actual extended period of low interest rates, along with expectations fostered by forward guidance of continued low rates, may be incentivizing financial market actors to take on additional risks to boost margins, thereby contributing to unsustainable increases in asset prices and a consequent buildup of systemic vulnerabilities. Indeed, in the years preceding the crisis, a few prescient observers swam against the tide of conventional wisdom to argue that a sustained period of low rates was inducing investors to "reach for yield" and thereby endangering the financial system.

Policymakers currently anticipate the Fed will hold interest rates near zero into 2015, followed by only a gradual path of tightening. The concern is that such a long period of low rates will spawn an asset bubble, or bubbles, similar to the process that many feel fueled the housing boom last decade. The eventual unwinding of any bubbles would likely be unpleasant. But, presumably, the period of low rates occurred for a reason - to support economic activity. Therein lies the conundrum for policymakers:

The very accommodative monetary policy that contributed to the restoration of financial stability could, if maintained long enough in the face of slow recovery in the real economy, eventually sow the seeds of renewed financial instability. Yet removal of accommodation could choke off the recovery just as it seems poised to gain at least a bit more momentum.

So how can the Federal Reserve protect against financial instability? Tarullo here makes a point I think the Fed will frequently reiterate:

As a preliminary matter, it is important to note that incorporating financial stability considerations into monetary policy decisions need not imply the creation of an additional mandate for monetary policy. The potentially huge effect on price stability and employment associated with bouts of serious financial instability gives ample justification.

By addressing financial instability risks, they are attempting to minimize deviations in inflation and unemployment. In effect, they might slow the pace of activity on the upside in return for minimizing the downside. This, however, is easier said then done, as it is difficult to sell delaying progress on the real problems of low inflation and high unemployment to fight against a phantom downturn:

Of course, this preliminary observation underscores the fact that the identification of systemic risks, especially those based on the putative emergence of asset bubbles, is not a straightforward exercise. The eventual impact of the bursting of the pre-crisis housing bubble on financial stability went famously underdiagnosed by policymakers and many private analysts. But there would be considerable economic downside in reacting with policy measures each time a case could be made that a bubble was developing.

The Fed is actively paying attention to markets in the search for stability risks. Tarullo reports the outcome of the Fed's new macroprudential efforts:

At present, our monitoring does find some evidence of increased duration and credit risk, but the increases appear relatively moderate to date--particularly at the largest banks and life insurers. Moreover, valuations for broad categories of assets such as real estate and corporate equities remain within historical norms, suggesting that valuation pressures, if present, are confined to narrower segments of assets. For example, valuations do appear stretched for farmland, although recent data are suggesting some slowing, and for the equity prices of some small technology firms.

No broad-based concerns such as the equity surge of the 1990s or the housing boom of the 2000s. Just pockets of issues here and there. That said, all is not perfect:

Still, there are areas where investors appear to have been very sanguine regarding certain types of exposure and modest in their demands for compensation to assume such risk. High-yield corporate bond and leveraged loan funds, for instance, have seen strong inflows, reflecting greater investor appetite for risky corporate credits, while underwriting standards have deteriorated, raising the possibility of large losses going forward.

Weak underwriting for risky, leveraged assets that investors seem eager to acquire for unusually little reward. This is the kind of situation, especially with leveraged assets, that will repeatedly gain the Fed's attention going forward. What action has the Fed taken? Tarullo:

In these circumstances, it has to date seemed appropriate to rely on supervisory responses. For example, in the face of substantial growth in the volume of leveraged lending and the deterioration in underwriting standards, the Federal Reserve, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation issued updated guidance on leverage lending in March 2013. This guidance outlined principles related to safe and sound leveraged lending activities, including the expectation that banks and thrifts originate leveraged loans using prudent underwriting standards regardless of their intent to hold or distribute them.

In addition, the Federal Reserve, alongside other regulators, has been working with the firms we supervise to increase their resilience to possible interest rate shocks...Our analysis to this point (undertaken outside of our annual stress test program) suggests that banking firms are capitalized to withstand the losses in asset valuations that would arise from large spikes in rates, which, moreover, would see an offset from the increase in the value of bank deposit franchises. This finding is consistent with the lack of widespread stress during the period of May through June 2013 when interest rates increased considerably. The next set of stress-test results, which we will release next month, will provide further insight on this point, both to regulators and to markets.

Some enhanced guidance and additional stress tests. I think it would be reasonable to describe this response as underwhelming. Would "additional guidance" have deterred lending activity during the housing bubble? I somehow doubt it. Indeed, Tarullo has his doubts:

While ad hoc supervisory action aimed at specific lending or risks is surely a useful tool, it has its limitations. First, it is a bit too soon to judge precisely how effective these supervisory actions--such as last year's leveraged lending guidance--have been. Second, even if they prove effective in containing discrete excesses, it is not clear that the somewhat deliberate supervisory process would be adequate to deal with a more pervasive reach for yield affecting many areas of credit extension. Third, and perhaps most important, the extent to which supervisory practice can either lean against the wind or increase the overall resiliency of the financial system is limited by the fact that it applies only to prudentially regulated firms. This circumstance creates an incentive for intermediation activities to migrate outside of the regulated sector.

The last point is critical. Increased regulatory activity might just push more activity into the shadow banking realm. There the threat of financial instability might increase exponentially, but without a regulator as a backstop. I think this issue will tend to restrain the Fed's interest in heavy-handed regulatory activity.

Tarullo follows with a discussing of time-varying policies, citing the example of increased loan-to-value requirements for mortgages as lending accelerates. This is an area to watch, as Tarullo sees value in this approach:

...I would devote particular attention to policies that can act as the rough equivalent of an increase in interest rates for particular sources of funding. Such policies would be more responsive to problems that were building quickly because of certain kinds of credit, without regard to whether they were being deployed in one or many sectors of the economy...

Such policies could slow the progress of an asset bubble and, as Tarullo points out, provide additional time for policymakers to determine if the situation requires a change in overall monetary policy. Ultimately, however, Tarullo is a realist. He doesn't intent to put all his eggs in the macroprudential basket:

The foregoing discussion has considered the ways in which existing supervisory authority and new forms of macroprudential authority may allow monetary policymakers to avoid, or at least defer, raising interest rates to contain growing systemic risks under circumstances in which policy is falling well short of achieving one or both elements of the dual mandate. However, as has doubtless been apparent, I believe these alternative policy instruments have real limitations.

As he later says, this means that the Fed should not take the direct monetary policy action "off the table" when it comes to addressing financial instability. What does that mean for policy in the near term? Tarullo:

As I noted earlier, I do not think that at present we are confronted with a situation that would warrant a change in the monetary policy we have been pursuing...

Not terribly surprising. After all, given that policymakers expect a long period of low rates, they obviously are not expecting sufficient financial instability to justify changing that outcome. But expect more talk about the topic:

...But for that very reason, now is a good time to consider these issues more actively. One useful step would be development of a framework that would allow us to make a more analytic, less instinctual judgment on the potential tradeoffs between enhanced financial stability and reduced economic activity. This will be an intellectually challenging exercise, but in itself does not entail any changes in policy.

Bottom Line: The Fed continues to explore the role of monetary policy in addressing asset bubbles. But engaging such concerns head on with tighter policy remains a secondary option. The first option is a variety of macroprudential tools. Moreover, policymakers believe they have the time to explore such tools, much as they have had time to consider managing their expanded balance sheet. They will also remain cautious to act out fear of increasing the risk of instability by driving activity out from under their purview. At this point, my gut reaction is that by the time the Fed feels they are left with no other option but to tighten policy to limit financial instability risks, the damage will already have been done.

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