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May 5, 2009

Economist's View - 5 new articles

"The 'Hundred Days' of F.D.R."

Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. on FDR and the New Deal:

The 'Hundred Days' of F.D.R., by Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., Commentary, NY Times, April 1983: Exactly half a century ago, the Republic plunged into the Hundred Days - that time of tumultuous change when a flood of legislation swept away venerable market practices and gave the American economic system a new contour. ...

The Hundred Days were only the start of a process that ended by transforming American society. Who can now imagine a day when America offered no Social Security, no unemployment compensation, no food stamps, no Federal guarantee of bank deposits, no Federal supervision of the stock market, no Federal protection for collective bargaining, no Federal standards for wages and hours, no Federal support for farm prices or rural electrification, no Federal refinancing for farm and home mortgages, no Federal commitment to high employment or to equal opportunity - in short, no Federal responsibility for Americans who found themselves, through no fault of their own, in economic or social distress?

These social changes have won general approval. Even the Reagan counterrevolution, for all its 19th-century laissez-faire and Social Darwinist passions, shrinks from abolishing the framework of social protection -the ''safety nets'' - created by the New Deal.

But what of the narrowly economic results? How effective was the New Deal in reducing unemployment, promoting economic growth and altering the distribution of income? And does the experience of half a century ago offer any guidance to the nation in its economic perplexities today?

The technique of the New Deal was improvisation and experiment. ... In the intellectual circumstances of the time, there was really no alternative to experiment. The Hundred Days found the country in a state of invincible ignorance. No one knew the causes of the Depression. No one knew the cure. Business leaders and academic economists alike were analytically baffled and impotent. ...

Economists had been so wrong in the recent past and were in such hot disagreement in the urgent present that no non-economist could take the profession seriously. ...

F.D.R. had had a reasonable exposure to the economic thought of his time. At Harvard he had taken more credits in economics than in any field except history and English. His teachers -William Z. Ripley, A. Piatt Andrew, O.M.W. Sprague - were in the reformist school that hoped to mitigate laissez-faire by regulation.

In the 1920's he had been active in the business self-regulation movement. As Governor of New York, he had pioneered in regional planning, conservation, electric power development and welfare legislation.

The President-elect emerged from this varied experience with a patrician disdain for business wisdom and a curiosity about economists. ''This nation asks for action, and action now,'' he said in his inaugural address.

He looked first to national planning, ''a fair and just concert of interests,'' with business, labor, agriculture and consumers working together under government leadership. Each unit ''must think of itself as a part of a greater whole; one piece in a large design.''

This integrative approach sprang from his sense of the nation as a great community. It found particular expression in the National Recovery Administration and the Agricultural Adjustment Administration. These mechanisms of negotiation and coordination soon arrested the fall in production and prices and brought about a measure of re-employment.

But they also encountered difficulties. N.R.A. especially tried to run too much; and, though it gave new status to organized labor, business used its dominating position in many industrial codes to fix prices and restrict production. In the end, the laws fell afoul of the Supreme Court.

The Second New Deal After 1935 Roosevelt embarked on a new tack: leftward in rhetoric, rightward in policy. Instead of seeking business partnership in the reorganization of economic institutions, the Second New Deal embraced the theory of a competitive economy and strove for recovery through a three-pronged reform campaign.

One prong, which naturally outraged those businessmen who endorsed competition in principle but hated it in practice, was a campaign against the ''economic royalists'' and the concentration of private economic power. The thesis, Roosevelt said in 1938, ''is not that the system of free private enterprise for profit has failed in this generation, but that it has not yet been tried.''

A second prong aimed at the stimulus of the economy through deficit spending. Keynes in his 1936 book ''The General Theory of Employment, Interest, and Money'' gave compensatory fiscal policy its classic rationale.

But the New Deal came to public spending earlier and for its own reasons. It created deficits to combat human suffering, and it found its early justification in the arguments of the Utah banker Marriner Eccles, whom Roosevelt made chairman of the Federal Reserve Board.

He took his ideas from two now forgotten American economic writers, William Trufant Foster and Waddill Catchings, whose irreverent critique of Say's Law in the 1920's had demonstrated the perils of oversaving, concluding with the brisk injunction: ''When business begins to look rotten, more public spending.'' ...

The third prong in the Second New Deal was targeted attention to weak sectors in the economy - the South, the West, housing, railroads. Here the Reconstruction Finance Corporation, headed by a Texas banker, Jesse Jones, played a key role. The R.F.C., and later its wartime subsidiary, the Defense Plant Corporation, liberated the colonial South and West from the New York capital market and used government money to lay the foundation for the postwar boom in the Sun Belt.

(The Sun Belt today repays Washington's initiative by opposing, in the sacred name of free enterprise, government intervention on behalf of other parts of the country, as, for example, the decaying industrial heartland of the Middle West and Northeast.)

All this Rooseveltian hyperactivity brought the country through the worst of the Depression. By 1940 the gross national product was higher than in 1929 and over 60 percent higher than in 1933.

As has been often noted, the New Deal did not solve the problem of unemployment. By 1940 the jobless rate had been cut by nearly two thirds, to 9.3 percent of the labor force from 25.2 percent in 1933. Still five million people lacked jobs.

So much re-employment in half a dozen years was a not inconsiderable accomplishment...The reason the New Deal did not do even better was that Roosevelt, though much denounced at the time as a profligate spender, remained at heart a budget-balancer and a planner. In any event, the hysterical opposition of businessmen to public spending for anyone but themselves made it politically impossible for him to spend very much.

The largest peacetime deficit the big spender produced was a feeble $3.5 billion in 1936. The increase in public debt through the 1930's hardly offset the contraction in private debt. It was not until war legitimized really effective deficits - $18 billion in 1942, $54 billion in 1943 - that unemployment disappeared; proving incidentally how right Eccles and Keynes were.

The New Deal, aided by wartime full employment, also had some impact on the distribution of income. The top fifth of American families received only 46 percent of aggregate personal income in 1946, down from 54.4 percent in 1929, while the share of the lowest two-fifths rose to 16 percent from 12.5 percent.

This was not a great change. But it was the only reversal in the trend of income distribution in American history before or since (except for a brief moment in the 1960's, and is thereby an achievement.

Roosevelt was concerned not only with getting out of the Depression but with preventing new depressions in the future. For the Great Depression was a traumatic experience. Mass unemployment, doubt whether democratic institutions could master economic crisis, the waiting specters of Communism and fascism - all this gave democratic society such a scare in the 1930's that a primary New Deal goal was to make the American economy depression-proof.

Before the New Deal, in those glorious days of the gold standard and the unregulated marketplace, the nation had gone through a bad depression every 20 years or so - 1819, 1837, 1857, 1873, 1893, 1907, 1921, 1929. The New Deal now moved to equip the economy with built-in stabilizers designed to protect individuals against unemployment, businesses against bankruptcy and society as a whole against the roller coaster of boom-and-bust.

This effort to make the economy depression-proof was remarkably successful - as proven by the fact that, for the first time in American history, the nation has gone 40 years without a major depression. If we avoid such a depression today, it will be not because of voodoo economics, but because of the stabilizers that Franklin Roosevelt built into the economy. ...

In dealing with the problems of our time, have we anything to learn from the brilliant experiments of the 1930's? In so far as New Deal issues remain, like mass unemployment, regional poverty, conservation and income distribution, it does no harm to consider New Deal remedies. Felix Rohatyn has long called for a resurrection of the R.F.C. The House of Representatives recently voted to establish an American Conservation Corps. Secretary Watt's effort to deliver the public domain to private greed has revitalized the conservation cause. ...

For a long time historians condemned Roosevelt's First New Deal, with its focus on structure, negotiation and planning, as a bad turn on a wrong road. This judgment prevailed so long as fiscal and monetary fine-tuning appeared to contain the solution to our economic dilemmas.

But we have come to understand that, in an economy dominated by market power concentrated in large corporations and unions, fiscal and monetary policy can restrain inflation only by very crude-tuning - to put it bluntly, by inducing mass unemployment.

The economic logic of N.R.A. was perhaps not so irrelevant as conventional critics have assumed. Perhaps it was the Second New Deal that made the bad turn down the wrong road when it sought to revive the pure competitive model in an economy whose commanding heights had been seized by concentrated market power.

The First New Deal aimed to replace the institutionalized warfare of government against business, labor against management, by negotiation and coordination under government direction: instead of the adversarial cockpit, social partnership. The institutions of the early 1930's were too sketchy and improvised, too sweeping in their reach, too distorted by special interests, too confused by melodrama, to attain effective coordination.

But what is experiment, after all, but trial and error? The First New Deal at least operated in terms of a realistic model of the market. ...

In the search for ... a policy ... for ... the deterioration of our infrastructure, the decline of Smokestack America, the global redivision of labor - we can no longer reject the idea of a concert of interests that F.D.R. affirmed in the 1932 campaign nor dodge the challenge of coordination he set out to explore in the Hundred Days.

There may also be something of value in the moral philosophy that animated the Hundred Days. We all recall from F.D.R.'s first inaugural that the only thing we have to fear is fear itself.

While magnificent rhetoric, that line isn't much help now. It didn't really make great sense even then. We had quite a number of things to fear in 1933 besides fear itself. Nor would the rejection of fear have sent our troubles away.

Rereading the inaugural today, one is struck by a different passage - by Roosevelt's stinging indictment of the ethic of the ''money changers'' who, ''stripped of the lure of profit by which to induce our people to follow their false leadership ... have fled from their high seats in the temple of our civilization.''

The time had come, Roosevelt said, to ''restore that temple to the ancient truths. The measure of that restoration lies in the extent to which we apply social values more noble than mere monetary profit. ... These dark days will be worth all they cost us if they teach us that our true destiny is not to be ministered unto but to minister to ourselves and our fellow men.''

Perhaps our nation will be more united, more equitable and more prosperous, too, if we abandon the current program of cutting taxes for the rich and social programs for the poor and recall the proposition Roosevelt set forth in his second inaugural:

''The test of our progress is not whether we add more to the abundance of those who have much; it is whether we provide enough for those who have too little.''

"Staying the Course . . . Toward 1990s Japan?"

I have a guest post at the Washington Post's new blog, The Hearing, run by Simon Johnson and James Kwak. The post responds to Ben Bernanke's testimony this morning before the Joint Economic Committee:

History's Lessons

Having posted Paul Krugman's A History Lesson for Alan Meltzer as rebuttal to Alan Meltzer's Inflation Nation, I suppose it's only fair to link to Meltzer's response.

Update: Paul Krugman responds via email:

I don't understand what Mr. Meltzer is saying here. He made an assertion; the data for Japan contradict this assertion, no matter what role he may have had in advising Japanese officials.

Too Big to Prosecute?

John Ashcroft says hang 'em high, but only if it doesn't cost us jobs:

Bailout Justice, by John Ashcroft, Commentary, NY Times: ...[N]o one has discussed the inherent conflict of interest that the government created when it infused large sums of money into [banks]. The government now has an extraordinarily high fiduciary duty to safeguard the stability and health of companies that received hundreds of billions of bailout money. At the same time, the Justice Department has the duty to indict a corporation if the evidence dictates such severe action — and an indictment is often a death sentence for a corporation. The quandary is obvious. How, then, does the Justice Department bring charges against a corporation that is now owned by the government?

The tsunami of corporate scandals that shook our economy in 2001 — Enron, WorldCom, Adelphia and others — provides us with an instructive example. The Justice Department moved swiftly to bring corporate wrongdoers to justice. But we also learned that when dealing with major companies or industries, we had to carefully consider the collateral consequences of our prosecutions.

Would there be unintended human carnage in the form of thousands of lost jobs? Would shareholders, some of whom had already suffered a great deal, lose more of their investment? What impact would our actions have on the economy? We realized that we had an obligation to minimize the harm to innocent citizens.

Among the options we pursued were deferred prosecution agreements. These court-authorized agreements ... offered more appropriate methods of providing justice... In September 2007, for instance, the Justice Department and the nation's five largest manufacturers of prosthetic hips and knees reached agreements over allegations that they gave kickbacks to orthopedic surgeons. Think of the effect on the community if these companies had been shuttered: employees would have lost their jobs, shareholders and pensioners would have lost their savings and countless people in need of hip and knee replacement would have been out of luck... In these types of circumstances, a deferred prosecution agreement is clearly better for everyone.

The government must hold accountable any individuals who acted illegally in this financial meltdown, while preserving the viability of the companies that received bailout funds or stimulus money. Certainly, we should demand justice. But we must all remember that justice is a value, the adherence to which includes seeking the best outcome for the American people. In some cases it will be the punishing of bad actors. In other cases it may involve heavy corporate fines or operating under a carefully tailored agreement.

In 2001,... we learned that there was often a better solution than closing ... companies. ...

I'm not a big fan of delaying justice even if it means closing a company. And if we started a prosecution today, how long would it be before it would actually came to trial? Years? Isn't that enough of a delay? I certainly don't think anyone should escape justice or be treated less severely because they are too big to prosecute.

[He also says, "I can imagine the attorney general facing not too subtle pressure from the president's economic team to go easy on such companies." Not too subtle pressure from the president's team? I bet he can imagine that.]

Here's the program he is talking about:

In Shift, Ashcroft to Testify on Oversight Deal, by Carrie Johnson, Washington Post, February 26, 2008; D01: Former Attorney General John D. Ashcroft agreed last night to appear at a House hearing to discuss his lucrative arrangement overseeing a medical equipment company, averting a showdown with committee members who had planned to meet today to authorize a subpoena.

The move marks an about-face for Ashcroft, who told lawmakers earlier this month that "discussing the details of my legal responsibilities, as requested, in this pending criminal case and related ongoing criminal investigation would violate my ethical obligations."

Ashcroft, who left public service three years ago to start a private consulting firm, won the contract under a settlement the company reached with federal prosecutors in New Jersey. Under a recent government policy, companies facing criminal investigation can accept such outside supervision to avoid indictment.

Ashcroft's consulting firm stands to collect between $28 million and $52 million over 18 months for reviewing the operations of Zimmer Holdings, an Indiana company that makes replacement hips and knees. Zimmer last year settled government charges over kickbacks it allegedly provided doctors in exchange for using its products. ...

Zimmer paid the Ashcroft Group $7.5 million between last September and January... Ashcroft and about a half-dozen senior staff members of his firm are covered under a flat $750,000 monthly payment from Zimmer. ...

No wonder he likes it so much.

links for 2009-05-05

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